“A Search Is a Search”: Scanning a Credit, Debit, or Gift Card Is a Search Under the Fourth Amendment by LeBlanc, John A.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 3 Article 7
3-26-2018
“A Search Is a Search”: Scanning a Credit, Debit, or
Gift Card Is a Search Under the Fourth
Amendment
John A. LeBlanc
Boston College Law School, john.leblanc.2@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Evidence Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the
Science and Technology Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John A. LeBlanc, “A Search Is a Search”: Scanning a Credit, Debit, or Gift Card Is a Search Under the Fourth Amendment, 59 B.C.L. Rev.
1089 (2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss3/7
  1089 
“A SEARCH IS A SEARCH”: SCANNING A 
CREDIT, DEBIT, OR GIFT CARD IS A SEARCH 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Abstract: On May 18, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
United States v. Hillaire, joined the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth circuits in holding 
that the government’s act of scanning the magnetic stripes of lawfully seized 
credit, debit, or gift cards to access the information encoded therein is not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In each case, the courts 
concluded that an individual is precluded from claiming a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the electronic information encoded on a card’s magnetic stripe. This 
Note provides an overview of how Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved 
in light of advances in technology and introduces the current standard by which 
courts determine whether governmental conduct amounts to a Fourth Amend-
ment search. This Note goes on to argue that both existing precedent on Fourth 
Amendment search determinations and the technological realities of the modern 
world should allow an individual to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
this information. Accordingly, scanning the magnetic stripe of a card to access its 
encoded information should be considered a Fourth Amendment search. 
INTRODUCTION 
Millions of Americans fall victim to acts of identity theft each year.1 In 
2016 alone, the number of identity theft victims totaled an estimated 15.4 mil-
lion Americans.2 Notably, many of these crimes involved the theft of credit 
card account information.3 Once stolen, credit or debit card account infor-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Identity Theft and Data Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N., https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/media-resources/identity-theft-and-data-security [https://perma.cc/4AGJ-6SBF] (illustrating the 
frequency of identity theft complaints each year); see also Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and 
Crime, INS. INFO. INSTIT., http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/identity-theft-and-cybercrime [https://
perma.cc/X74J-R9MY] (reporting recent identity theft crime statistics); Martyn Williams, One in 
Every 14 Americans Fell Victim to Identity Theft Last Year, PCWORLD (Sept. 27, 2015, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2986810/security/identity-theft-hit-7-of-us-population-last-year.html 
[https://perma.cc/6AQ4-6SBP] (describing 2014 identity theft statistics). 
 2 Herb Weisbaum, Identity Fraud Hits Record Number of Americans in 2016, NBC NEWS (Feb. 
2, 2017, 7:21 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/identity-fraud-hits-record-number-
americans-2016-n715756 [https://perma.cc/P7FC-HJKK] (describing a recent study performed by 
Javelin Strategy & Research that determined how many Americans were victims of identity theft in 
2016). 
 3 Id. Identity thieves routinely gain access to consumer account information by hacking or other-
wise breaching the consumer financial records of large businesses. See Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data 
Breaches: What the Underground World of “Carding” Reveals, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH 
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mation can be used in a variety of ways to inflict substantial pecuniary harm 
on the account holder.4 One method that perpetrators use to exploit stolen ac-
count information involves re-encoding the magnetic stripes of existing or 
counterfeit credit, debit, or gift cards (collectively, “cards”) with the stolen ac-
count information.5 Once the magnetic stripe on the back of any such card is 
re-encoded with stolen account information, the card can be used to make pur-
chases that will in turn be charged to the victim’s account.6 
Typically, the front and back of a card is embossed with the card holder’s 
first and last name, the card number, the expiration date, and the card security 
                                                                                                                           
TECH. L.J. 375, 378–79 (2009) (listing large chain retailers that suffered data breaches that exposed 
consumer debit and credit card account information to identity thieves and explaining how the com-
promised information is used to commit fraud). These types of large scale breaches are often highly 
publicized. See, e.g., Kara Brandeisky, Anthem Health Insurance Was Hacked. Here’s What Custom-
ers Need to Know, MONEY (Feb. 5, 2015), http://time.com/money/3697026/anthem-data-breach-
social-security/ [https://perma.cc/N896-3A6A] (detailing the hack of approximately 80 million An-
them Health Insurance customers); CVS Alerts Photo Site Users After Confirming July Data Breach, 
NBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2015, 5:47 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/cvs-alerts-photo-site-
users-after-confirming-july-data-breach-n426126 [https://perma.cc/M2PU-UJEV] (describing the data 
breaches that exposed the financial information of CVS Health-Corp, Rite-Aid, Costco, and Wal-Mart 
Canada customers); Gregory Wallace, Target Credit Card Hack: What You Need to Know, CNN (Dec. 
23, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/22/news/companies/target-credit-card-hack/ 
[https://perma.cc/RYH4-9MT5] (recounting how the information of over 40 million credit and debit 
card accounts were stolen from Target Corporation). 
 4 See Olivia DeGennaro, How Thieves Can Access Your Credit Card Information Without Ever 
Touching Your Card, NBC RENO (July 27, 2016), http://mynews4.com/news/local/how-thieves-can-
access-your-credit-card-information-without-ever-touching-your-card [https://perma.cc/3XXX-JANC] 
(describing the consequences associated with having one’s credit card information stolen); Identity 
Theft & Credit Card Fraud—How to Protect Yourself, WALL STREET J., http://guides.wsj.com/personal-
finance/credit/how-to-protect-yourself-from-identity-theft/ [https://perma.cc/GZT8-JSGC] (explaining 
that the risks associated with the exposure of one’s credit card account information may include a thief 
opening new accounts, taking out loans in the victim’s name, or using the information to make purchas-
es); Theresa Payton, What Really Happens After Your Credit Card Is Stolen, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 
2014, 6:26 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/credit-card-stolen/story?id=25633648 [https://
perma.cc/TRR5-2B6U] (explaining how identity thieves can use stolen credit card account infor-
mation to sell the information to other criminals, use the information to make purchases, re-encode the 
account information onto fraudulent cards, or make purchases and then sell the items for cash). But see 
Peretti, supra note 3, at 379) (describing how a victim’s monetary liability due to unauthorized credit 
or debit card use may be limited by federal law). 
 5 United States v. Turner, 839 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 2016) (describing the need for a specific 
piece of equipment to re-encode the magnetic stripe of a credit card); Jay S. Albanese, Fraud: The 
Characteristic Crime of the Twenty-First Century, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND FRAUD: 
COMBATING PIRACY 1, 6 (Jay S. Albanese ed., 2007) (describing the process of re-encoding a credit 
or debit card with stolen account information); Byron Acohido & Jon Swartz, Thieves Turn Simple 
Strip into Cutting-Edge Tool, USA TODAY (July 31, 2007, 11:57 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/tech/news/computersecurity/infotheft/2007-07-31-gift-cards_N.htm [https://perma.cc/N292-
FZNX] (discussing the method by which identity thieves re-encode the magnetic stripe of gift cards 
with stolen credit card account information by using a “‘magstripe reader-writer’”). 
 6 See United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1212 (D. N.M. 2013) (explaining that when a 
fraudulent card is used, the purchase or withdrawal will be charged to the victim’s account). 
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code (“CSC code”).7 The same information will ordinarily be encoded on the 
magnetic stripe of the card as well.8 A card’s magnetic stripe, however, can be 
manually re-encoded to store other information, such as a victim’s stolen card 
number.9 Because a fraudulent card appears authentic on its face, its fraudu-
lence typically cannot be recognized by anyone, including government offi-
cials, unless and until it is scanned by a magnetic card reader.10 Once scanned, 
the government is able to compare the information embossed on the front and 
back of the seized card with the electronic information encoded on the card’s 
magnetic stripe.11 If the two sets of information differ, the card may be deemed 
fraudulent.12 
As this method of identity theft has become more prevalent over the last 
several years, courts have increasingly been tasked with answering the critical 
question of whether or not the government’s act of scanning a seized card is a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.13 Within the last three 
years, each in a case of first impression, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have held that it is not a search.14 In-
deed, every federal court to have addressed the issue has ruled that scanning a 
card is not a Fourth Amendment search.15 
                                                                                                                           
 7 United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Harvey v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 561 (2015); see also Turner, 839 F.3d at 435 (describing electronic information 
contained within the magnetic stripe of gift cards); United States v. DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d 426, 430 (8th 
Cir. 2016) (same). 
 8 Bah, 794 F.3d at 623; see also Turner, 839 F.3d at 435; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 430. 
 9 Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 1212 (detailing trial testimony that explained that by using a specific 
device, identity thieves are able to re-encode the magnetic stripes of fraudulent cards with a victim’s 
actual account information). 
 10 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 431–32 (describing how the seized cards were revealed to be fraudu-
lent only upon scanning them); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 429 (explaining that charges were brought only 
after scans of the confiscated cards revealed them to be fraudulent). 
 11 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 431–32; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 429; see also Bah, 794 F.3d at 623; 
Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 1212. 
 12 See Bah, 794 F.3d at 623 (chronicling how the suspects were arrested after scans of seized 
cards revealed the account information encoded on the magnetic stripes to be different from the ac-
count information embossed on the front of the cards); see also Turner, 839 F.3d at 431–32 (describ-
ing how the seized cards were revealed to be fraudulent only upon scanning them); DE L’Isle, 825 
F.3d at 429 (explaining that charges were brought only after scans of the confiscated cards revealed 
them to be fraudulent). 
 13 See, e.g., Turner, 839 F.3d at 431; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 430; Bah, 794 F.3d at 621; Alabi, 943 
F. Supp. 2d at 1207. 
 14 See United States v. Hillaire, 857 F.3d 128, 130 (1st Cir. 2017); Turner, 839 F.3d at 431; DE 
L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 430; Bah, 794 F.3d at 621. 
 15 See, e.g., Hillaire, 857 F.3d at 130; Turner, 839 F.3d at 431; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 430; Bah, 
794 F.3d at 621; United States v. DE L’Isle, No. 4:14-CR-3089, 2014 WL 5431349, at *4 (D. Neb. 
Oct. 24, 2014); Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 1207; Report and Recommendation on Defendant’s Motion 
to Suppress, United States v. Medina, No. 09-20717-CR, 2009 WL 3669636, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 
24, 2009). 
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This Note will discuss how these recent decisions have analyzed the Fourth 
Amendment implications of scanning the magnetic stripe of a card to access the 
electronic data encoded therein.16 Part I provides an overview of how Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has evolved in light of advances in technology and 
introduces the current standard that courts use to determine whether governmen-
tal conduct amounts to a Fourth Amendment search.17 This part goes on to intro-
duce the U.S. Courts of Appeals’ recent foray into the constitutionality of scan-
ning cards without a warrant.18 Part II examines the reasoning underlying the 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits’ conclusions that these scans are not Fourth 
Amendment searches.19 Part III argues that, notwithstanding what the circuits 
have held in recent years, scanning the magnetic stripe of a lawfully seized card 
should be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.20 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S ADAPTION TO THE MODERN WORLD 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ensures that American 
citizens are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by the govern-
ment.21 The Amendment reigns in governmental conduct and seeks to safe-
guard privacy interests.22 Accordingly, a court’s initial determination of wheth-
er or not governmental conduct amounts to a Fourth Amendment search is de-
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 95–150 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 21–90 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 95–150 and accompanying text. Although the First Circuit in Hillaire conclud-
ed that scanning a card was not a search, the court did not provide its own reasoning or otherwise 
thoroughly analyze the issue. Hillaire, 857 F.3d at 130. Instead, the court simply quoted the reasoning 
of the Bah and DE L’Isle courts in a brief footnote. Id. at 130 n.3. The only other First Circuit decision 
addressing this issue similarly did not include a thoroughly detailed reasoning behind the decision. See 
United States v. Ramdihall, 859 F.3d 80, 95 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that the appellant had waived any 
argument that scanning seized credit cards amounted to a Fourth Amendment search because the ap-
pellant did not assert that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the encoded information on 
appeal). Accordingly, only the opinions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits will be analyzed in this 
Note. See infra notes 106–137 (analyzing the Bah, DE L’Isle, and Turner decisions). 
 20 See infra notes 151–213 and accompanying text. As with Part II of this Note, the First Circuit’s 
decision in Hillaire will not be analyzed in Part III. See supra note 19. 
 21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”); see Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482–83 (2014) 
(summarizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) 
(discussing the scope of what is protected by the Fourth Amendment); John Potapchuk, Note, A Sec-
ond Bite at the Apple: Federal Courts’ Authority to Compel Technical Assistance to Government 
Agents in Accessing Encrypted Smartphone Data Under the All Writs Act, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1403, 
1412–13 (2016) (discussing the scope of Fourth Amendment protections). 
 22 See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (noting that the Bill of Rights was created as a 
way to “take government off the backs of people”); Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 
U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (noting that the “basic purpose” of the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials”). 
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terminative of whether or not the full weight of the Amendment’s protections 
will apply.23 
Although Fourth Amendment searches were first thought to occur only 
when the government physically trespassed onto “a constitutionally protected 
area,” advancements in technology over the latter half of the twentieth century 
forced the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit that approach.24 Section A discusses 
the origins and evolution of Fourth Amendment search determinations.25 Section 
B provides an overview of specific instances where courts consistently hold that 
governmental conduct does not amount to a Fourth Amendment search.26 Sec-
tion C discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. California, 
which addressed privacy interests that arise with certain digital storage devices 
under the Fourth Amendment.27 This section goes on to introduce the U.S. 
Courts’ of Appeals recent foray into the constitutionality of scanning cards with-
out a warrant.28 
A. One Size Does Not Fit All: The Origins and Evolution of Fourth 
Amendment Search Determinations 
As with each of the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the 
Founders constructed the Fourth Amendment to protect against the abusive 
governmental overreach that colonial Americans were subjected to prior to the 
American Revolution.29 In order to guard against this type of governmental 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Allison M. Lucier, You Can Judge a Container by Its Cover: The Single-Purpose Contain-
er Exception and the Fourth Amendment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2009) (describing how 
courts adjudicate Fourth Amendment disputes). 
 24 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06, 408 (2012) (citing United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)) (explaining the evolution of the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to Fourth 
Amendment search determinations); Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (adopting a new approach to determin-
ing whether a search had occurred under the Fourth Amendment); see also infra notes 138–150 and 
accompanying text (describing Katz’s adoption of a new approach to Fourth Amendment search de-
terminations). 
 25 See infra notes 29–51 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 52–79 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 80–90 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 29 See Schneider, 390 U.S. at 25 (describing the purpose of the Bill of Rights); Camara, 387 U.S. 
at 528 (describing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 
1, 10 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that the Bill of Rights was created “to protect individual 
liberty against governmental procedures that the Framers thought should not be used”). The Fourth 
Amendment was a direct response to the Founders’ contempt for the British soldiers’ habit of “rum-
maging” through colonial homes and businesses without justification to do so. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); see Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (explaining that the impetus for 
the Fourth Amendment was the displeasure the colonial Americans had with the British government’s 
utilization of “writs of assistance” to authorize “unrestrained search[es] for evidence of criminal activ-
ity”); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965) (describing the origins of the Fourth Amend-
ment and noting that it was “most immediately the product of contemporary revulsion against a re-
gime of writs of assistance” that empowered investigators with “blanket authority to search where 
1094 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1089 
conduct, when a Fourth Amendment search is deemed to have occurred, the 
Fourth Amendment requires the government to prove that the search was rea-
sonable.30 To meet this threshold of reasonableness, the government is typical-
ly required to obtain a search warrant.31 In the absence of a warrant, however, 
a Fourth Amendment search may still be reasonable if the search falls within 
one of the several exceptions to the warrant requirement.32 
In most cases, when an object or item is lawfully seized by the govern-
ment, the government need not concern itself with any further Fourth Amend-
ment protections.33 As the Fifth Circuit has articulated, this is the case for ob-
jects such as firearms.34 Once seized, the government may examine the weap-
                                                                                                                           
they pleased”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–65 (1886) (quoting early colonial opinions 
on writs of assistance). 
 30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (noting that the Fourth Amendment “safe-
guard[s] the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental offi-
cials”); Lucier, supra note 23, at 1809 (noting that “the Fourth Amendment requires that all searches 
be reasonable”). 
 31 Lucier, supra note 23, at 1809; see Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (finding that “[o]ur cases have 
determined that ‘[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant’”) 
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 393–94 (1978) (finding that “warrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his 
person”); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454–55 (explaining that in general, searches performed by law en-
forcement without the prior authorization of a judge are violative of the Fourth Amendment). But see 
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 318 (2012) (ex-
plaining that courts may also deem a warrantless search to be reasonable if the government’s interest 
in searching the object “outweigh[s]” the individual’s privacy interest in the object being searched). 
 32 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (explaining that the warrant requirement 
has exceptions); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (noting that searches performed 
without a warrant are “invalid unless [they] fall[] within one of the narrow and well-delineated excep-
tions to the warrant requirement”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (describing “[s]earches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate” as “per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment” unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement); see 
also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(b) 
(5th ed. 2012) (describing exceptions to the warrant requirement); Alexander Porter, Note, “Time 
Works Changes”: Modernizing Fourth Amendment Law to Protect Cell Site Location Information, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 1781, 1786 (2016) (explaining the existence of exceptions to the warrant requirement). 
Notable exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches or seizures that are consented to by 
the individual whose person or property is subject to the search, searches conducted incident to a law-
ful arrest, or when evidence is in plain view of law enforcement. See John M.A. DiPippa, Is the 
Fourth Amendment Obsolete? Restating the Fourth Amendment in Functional Terms, 22 GONZ. L. 
REV. 483, 487 n.20 (1987) (listing the exceptions to the warrant requirement). Given the rights that 
are at stake when a warrant is not required, each exception is narrowly tailored and subject to careful 
analysis. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736–38 (1983) (describing the threshold for deter-
mining whether a warrant exception exists for evidence in plain view of law enforcement); Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 230–33 (1973) (discussing the standard for determining whether the 
consent exception to the warrant requirement was met); infra note 85 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the search incident to arrest exception of the warrant requirement). 
 33 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434 (noting that “[o]nce seized, most items do not give rise to a separate 
Fourth Amendment search inquiry”). 
 34 Id. 
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on without infringing on any privacy interests because the only privacy interest 
at stake is in the weapon itself.35 Other objects or items that are lawfully 
seized, however, may retain Fourth Amendment protections over their contents 
when such contents are not visible to the naked eye.36 For example, an individ-
ual retains Fourth Amendment protections in the contents of a seized wallet or 
suitcase.37 For a search of these seized items to be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, the government is typically required to either obtain a warrant or 
prove that the search falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment.38 This is true even of certain objects that contain digital data.39 
Given the limitations that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness re-
quirement imposes on the government, a reviewing court’s threshold determi-
nation of whether or not a Fourth Amendment search occurred is critical to 
each case.40 Because the driving force behind the Fourth Amendment was the 
fear of physical trespass by the government, Fourth Amendment search deter-
minations traditionally focused on whether or not the government had physi-
cally encroached upon a person or place.41 As technology evolved, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See id. (describing that “[t]he evidentiary value” of an object like a firearm lies “i[n] the object 
itself, so seizing them is all law enforcement needs to do”). 
 36 Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700–01 (1983) (discussing privacy interests 
in the contents of objects that contain other items); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 
(1982) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects containers that “conceal[] [their] contents from 
plain view”). One exception to this rule is when the object is a “single-purpose container.” See United 
States v. Eschweiler, 745 F.2d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that a privacy interest does not exist 
in the contents of a container when the nature of said contents can be determined just by looking at the 
container); Lucier, supra note 23, at 1817–19 (describing single-purpose containers and compiling 
relevant case law on the issue). The contents of these containers are apparent just by looking at the 
container itself and therefore do not give rise to a separate privacy interest. Eschweiler, 745 F.2d at 
440. 
 37 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 434 (describing separate privacy interests in contents of a suitcase); 
United States v. Rivera-Padilla, 365 F. App’x 343, 345–46 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding a warrantless 
search of a closed wallet to be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 38 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434. 
 39 Id.; see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–90 (holding a warrantless search of a cell phone to be 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
 40 See Lucier, supra note 23, at 1811 (noting that “[a]s a threshold question, courts must first 
determine whether a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ occurred”). 
 41 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 461–65 (1928) (holding that because there was 
no physical trespass, there was no Fourth Amendment search); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–06 
(discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s history of interpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect against 
“government trespass upon areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) [the Fourth Amendment] 
enumerates”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001) (describing the traditional approach 
to Fourth Amendment search determinations until the mid-twentieth century); Turner, 839 F.3d at 434 
(discussing how the Fourth Amendment is typically violated when “the government physically in-
trudes on a constitutionally protected area”); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Court After Scalia: Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence at a Crossroads, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 9, 2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-fourth-amendment-jurisprudence-at-a-crossroads/ 
[https://perma.cc/8DZV-VVFX] (describing Fourth Amendment originalism). Under this approach, 
the Fourth Amendment was thought to be violated only when the government physically trespassed 
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the traditional approach to Fourth Amendment search determinations risked 
rendering certain privacy interests unprotected.42 In response to this risk, in 
1967, in Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a more “prag-
matic” approach.43 
In Katz, the Court held that the government’s act of wiretapping a public 
telephone booth was a Fourth Amendment search.44 In so holding, the Court 
eschewed an application of the physical trespass approach in favor of an ap-
proach that considered an individual’s expectation of privacy in the object or 
item being searched.45 Justice Harlan articulated what has come to be known 
as the Katz standard in his concurrence, stating that a Fourth Amendment 
search occurs when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
                                                                                                                           
against a person or tangible property without a warrant. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05 (describing a 
trespass-based approach to Fourth Amendment search determinations); Porter, supra note 32, at 1787 
(describing the trespass-based origins of Fourth Amendment search determinations). 
 42 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 421–22 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing critiques to the trespass-based 
approach); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–35 (holding that the government’s use of thermal imaging on a house 
to determine if there were people inside constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment because, 
although there was no physical trespass, to hold otherwise would “leave the [suspect] at the mercy of 
advancing technology”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (noting that although electronic surveillance did 
not involve physical trespass, there was still an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment); 
see also Turner, 839 F.3d at 434 (describing how the majority of Fourth Amendment violations in-
volving technology do not involve a physical trespass). 
 43 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 405–06 (explaining the Supreme Court’s break from the traditional 
“property-based approach” to Fourth Amendment search determinations); Porter, supra note 32, at 
1787–88 (describing the Supreme Court’s evolution from the trespass-based approach to Fourth 
Amendment search determinations); Rosenthal, supra note 41 (describing the “pragmatic” approach to 
the Fourth Amendment taken by the Court in Katz v. United States). 
 44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59. Although the act of wiretapping a public phone booth may not have 
constituted a search under the traditional trespass-based theory, the Katz Court expanded Fourth 
Amendment protections to cover searches that may not involve a “physical intrusion” on a person or 
place. Id. at 353; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 421–22 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that Katz 
abandoned the “old approach” by disposing of the requirement of a physical trespass to find the 
Fourth Amendment had been infringed). As justification for doing so, the Katz Court reasoned that the 
traditional approach, as articulated in 1928 in Olmstead v. United States and in 1942 in Goldman v. 
United States, had been “so eroded by our subsequent decisions” that they could “no longer be regard-
ed as controlling.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (citing Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 
(1942) and Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457, 464, 466). 
 45 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Jones, 565 U.S. at 421–22 (citing Katz, 389 
U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment can be violated 
when a government search “violates a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’”); Christine S. 
Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital 
Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 21 (2015) (describing Fourth Amendment search determinations under the 
Katz standard); Potapchuk, supra note 21, at 1412–13 (discussing the Katz standard). The new ap-
proach set forth in Katz did not abolish the trespass-based approach to search determinations. See 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (finding that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added 
to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”) (emphasis added). Courts remain free to 
apply either test depending on the circumstances of the case. See id. at 409–11; see also LAFAVE, 
supra note 32, at § 2.1(e) (noting that the trespass theory is an “alternate theory” to the Katz expecta-
tion-of-privacy test). 
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object or item being searched.46 Accordingly, an analysis under the Katz stand-
ard requires both subjective and objective inquiries into an individual’s expec-
tation of privacy.47 
Under the Katz standard, an individual must first demonstrate that he or she 
had an actual—i.e. subjective—expectation of privacy in the object or item that 
has been searched.48 A reviewing court must then determine if the individual’s 
subjective expectation of privacy was reasonable under an objective standard.49 
This objective standard requires the expectation of privacy to be one that “socie-
ty is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”50 If both of these prongs are met, the 
governmental conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.51 
B. In the Interest of Clarity: Limitations on When an Individual May  
Claim a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The objective prong of the Katz analysis tasks courts with ultimately de-
ciding what is and is not reasonable in light of societal expectations of priva-
cy.52 Though far from a mechanical or scientific analysis, the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Turner, 839 F.3d at 434 (articulating the 
Katz standard); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431 (same). Applying this analysis to the case before the Katz 
Court, Justice Harlan concluded that an individual would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
upon entering a phone booth to make a phone call. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“[O]ne who occupies [a public telephone booth] . . . shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that 
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 47 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432 (acknowledging that the Katz analy-
sis requires proof of both a “subjective” and “objective” expectation of privacy); Huff v. Spaw, 794 
F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[c]ourts generally refer to Katz’s reasonable-expectation 
test as having a subjective part and an objective part”). 
 48 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432; Orin S. Kerr, Katz 
Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 113 (2015). 
In many cases, reviewing courts will either assume that this prong is met or avoid the subjective prong 
analysis altogether. See, e.g., DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432 (assuming the existence of an actual expecta-
tion of privacy in order to address the second prong of the Katz analysis); Bah, 794 F.3d at 630 n.9 
(assuming the existence of an actual expectation of privacy for purposes of the appeal despite noting 
reservations about whether such an expectation existed); see also LAFAVE, supra note 32, at § 2.1(c) 
(explaining that courts rarely address the subjective prong of the Katz analysis); Kerr, supra, at 130–
32 (arguing that the subjective prong of the Katz standard is a “phantom doctrine” due to the fact that 
courts rarely address or apply it). 
 49 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432. 
 50 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that “the [subjective] expectation [must] 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 199, 250 (1993) (arguing that the objective prong of the Katz analysis “implicitly en-
courages decision makers to define fundamental constitutional values by referring to contemporary 
social values, goals, and attitudes”). The true objectiveness of this standard, however, has been ques-
tioned. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (raising concerns that 
under the Katz standard, there is a risk that judges will input their own subjective views of reasona-
bleness). 
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Court has nevertheless identified several instances where an individual is pre-
cluded from claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy.53 These include, 
inter alia, purported expectations of privacy in objects, items, or information 
that: (1) have been exposed to the public; (2) are contraband; or (3) are volun-
tarily disclosed to third parties.54 In each instance, the Court has concluded that 
society does not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy.55 
First, courts preclude individuals from claiming a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in objects, items, or information that have been exposed to the pub-
lic.56 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an individual may not 
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in what is exposed to public view, 
what is contained in a garbage can that is placed on a public street, or even 
their location while driving on a public roadway.57 In the Court’s view, once an 
individual exposes something to the public, he or she cannot reasonably expect 
that it will remain private.58 
Second, courts rarely recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in ob-
jects, items, or information considered to be contraband.59 Accordingly, gov-
ernmental conduct that will “only” reveal the presence of contraband, rather 
than the presence of lawful activity, is not considered to be a Fourth Amend-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See infra notes 56–73 and accompanying text (describing instances when an individual may not 
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in objects or information). 
 54 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–10 (2005) (addressing contraband); Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (addressing information voluntarily disclosed to third parties); 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (addressing information exposed to the public). 
 55 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–10; Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–42; Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 56 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (finding that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”); David Reichbach, The 
Home Not the Homeless: What the Fourth Amendment Has Historically Protected and Where the Law 
Is Going After Jones, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 377, 385–88 (2012) (describing cases holding that an individ-
ual is precluded from claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy in objects, items, or information 
exposed to the public). 
 57 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989) (holding that aerial surveillance of an indi-
vidual’s backyard was not a Fourth Amendment search because it was exposed to the public’s vantage 
point); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding that there is no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in objects or items in a garbage can on a public street); Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 180–81 (1984) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in “open 
fields” because they are exposed to the public); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82 (holding that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their location while traveling on public roads); see also 
LAFAVE, supra note 32, at § 2.2 (noting that an individual may not claim a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in anything that “a law enforcement officer is able to detect [] by utilization of one or more of 
his senses while lawfully present at the vantage point where those senses are used”). 
 58 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 59 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–10 (noting that contraband “cannot be deemed ‘legitimate’” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes and thus is not protected); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137 
(1984); Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
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ment search.60 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this notion in 2005 in Illi-
nois v. Caballes.61 In Caballes, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment search 
did not occur when a police dog’s sniff of the trunk of a vehicle revealed the 
presence of narcotics.62 The Caballes Court concluded that because the police 
dog had been trained specifically to identify the presence of drugs, its sniff of 
the vehicle would reveal only contraband and nothing else.63 In the Court’s 
view, “governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband 
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”64 The Court emphasized the 
uniqueness of such governmental conduct, however, by characterizing dog 
sniffs as “sui generis”—Latin for unique.65 In the Court’s view, because the 
governmental conduct could not possibly reveal lawful activity, is was not a 
Fourth Amendment search.66 
The third preclusion has come to be known as the third-party doctrine, 
and is perhaps the most notorious.67 The third-party doctrine, broadly speak-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–10 (holding that a police dog’s sniff of a vehicle is not a Fourth 
Amendment search because the sniff would only reveal the presence of contraband); see Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. at 137 (holding that a chemical test that will only reveal whether the tested substance was 
contraband “compromises no legitimate privacy interest” because the test would not disclose a “‘pri-
vate’ fact”); Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (noting that a dog sniff of luggage “discloses only the presence or 
absence of narcotics, a contraband item[,]” and thus is not a search under the Fourth Amendment). But 
see Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2013) (declining to apply the Katz standard and holding 
that a dog sniff of a home was a Fourth Amendment search under the trespass-based approach to 
Fourth Amendment search determinations). 
 61 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. 
 62 Id. at 408–10. 
 63 Id. at 409. Given the specialized nature of a dog’s ability to alert only to contraband, the Court 
characterized this type of preclusion as “sui generis.” Id. 
 64 Id. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123). Notably, the Caballes Court distinguished its 
case from the Court’s 2001 decision in Kyllo v. United States. Id. at 409–10. In Kyllo, the Court held 
that law enforcement’s use of thermal technology to reveal the presence of heat lamps used to grow 
marijuana constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 533 U.S. at 38–40. The Caballes Court 
concluded that because the type of search in Kyllo could have revealed the presence of “lawful activi-
ty” in the home, the individual whose home was searched had a reasonable expectation that his or her 
“lawful activity w[ould] remain private.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10. The disputed search in Ca-
balles, the Court held, was distinguishable because the dog’s sniff could not have revealed lawful 
activity. Id. at 410. 
 65 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. This characterization came from the Court’s description of dog 
sniffs in 1983 in United States v. Place. 462 U.S. at 707. Critical to the Place Court’s characterization 
of a dog sniff as “sui generis” was the fact that there was no risk of an intrusive search that would 
reveal perfectly legal materials. Id. Although the Court felt comfortable in concluding that no search 
had occurred, it stressed that the circumstances leading to this determination were rare. Id. (finding 
that “we are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which 
the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure”). 
 66 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. 
 67 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (discussing the third-party doctrine); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (same); see also Porter, supra note 32, at 1788–90 (discussing the history of 
the third-party doctrine). In some instances, however, courts will apply the third-party doctrine to the 
subjective prong of the Katz analysis. See, e.g., DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432 (holding that one cannot 
have a subjective expectation of privacy in information that is voluntarily disclosed to third parties); 
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ing, dictates that an individual may not claim a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in information that has been voluntarily disclosed to third parties.68 The 
U.S. Supreme Court clearly articulated the doctrine in its 1979 decision in 
Smith v. Maryland.69 In Smith, law enforcement officers placed a pen register 
at the offices of Smith’s telephone company to record the telephone numbers 
that Smith dialed.70 The government later used these recorded telephone num-
bers as evidence against Smith.71 The Smith Court held that the government’s 
conduct did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search because Smith could 
not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers that he 
dialed.72 In the Court’s view, by dialing the numbers, Smith voluntarily dis-
closed them to a third party (the telephone company) and assumed the risk that 
the numbers would later be turned over to law enforcement.73 
Criticism of the third-party doctrine, however, has been levied since its 
inception.74 In his dissent in Smith, Justice Marshall argued, in part, that the 
voluntary disclosure of information for one purpose should not militate against 
a later expectation of privacy in the same information.75 In Justice Marshall’s 
                                                                                                                           
Bah, 794 F.3d at 630 n.9 (concluding that a larger factual record could have allowed the court to de-
termine that there was no subjective expectation of privacy); Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 1274–75 (not-
ing that courts have found that a “person’s disclosure of something in which the person asserts he or 
she has a reasonable expectation of privacy precludes finding the manifestation of such a subjective 
belief”). 
 68 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (discussing the third-party doctrine); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for 
the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563, 566–70 (2009) (describing the third-party 
doctrine and its origins). 
 69 See Porter, supra note 32, at 1789 (noting that Smith “named and further refined the third-party 
doctrine”). The articulation of the third-party doctrine in Smith was the culmination of several U.S. 
Supreme Court holdings that stood for the same proposition: that an individual may not claim a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. See Kerr, supra 
note 68, at 567–70 (describing the origins of the third-party doctrine); see, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 
443 (holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to a 
bank); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (holding there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information disclosed to a companion who later turned that information over to the gov-
ernment); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that no Fourth Amendment 
search occurred when the defendant disclosed incriminating information to an informant). 
 70 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 71 Id. (noting that the telephone numbers were used to convict Smith by confirming that he was 
the one who had called the victim shortly after robbing her). 
 72 Id. at 744–46; Porter, supra note 32, at 1789–90 (discussing the holding of Smith). 
 73 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–46; Porter, supra note 32, at 1789–90 (discussing the holding of 
Smith). 
 74 See State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 827 (Wis. 2014) (describing historical criticism of the 
third-party doctrine); Kerr, supra note 68, at 570–73 (discussing critiques of the third-party doctrine); 
see, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (criticizing the third-party doctrine’s 
current construction and application); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(noting that “[a] per se rule that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in information voluntarily dis-
closed to third parties seems unmoored from current understandings of privacy”) (emphasis added); 
Porter, supra note 32, at 1806–10 (arguing that the third-party doctrine should be “reformed”). 
 75 Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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view, “[p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at 
all.”76 These early concerns have not abated since Smith was decided.77 Con-
temporary criticism points to the fact that, in light of the economic and techno-
logical realities of today, individuals are regularly forced to disclose private 
information to third parties as a matter of course.78 Nevertheless, rather than 
adapt to these realities, federal courts seemingly remain steadfast in their rigid 
application of the third-party doctrine.79 
C. Get “Smart”: The Supreme Court Weighs in on Privacy  
Interests in Smart Phones 
As discussed supra, after a court has determined that a Fourth Amendment 
search has occurred, the court must then determine if the search was reasona-
ble.80 In June 2014, in Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
government’s act of opening a lawfully arrested individual’s cell phone without a 
warrant to access the data and information stored therein was unreasonable.81 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. 
 77 See Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 261 (2015) (arguing that 
“[t]he third-party doctrine has become the Fourth Amendment’s supervillain”); Kerr, supra note 68, at 
563 n.5 “The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate . . . . A list of 
every article or book that has criticized the doctrine would make [for] the world’s longest law review 
footnote.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that the third-party doc-
trine is “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about them-
selves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks”); Tate, 849 N.W.2d at 827 (“In the 
modern world, in which we regularly disclose information to third parties as part of everyday life, the 
third-party doctrine is ailing as a principle of law.”); Bambauer, supra note 77, at 216 (discussing how 
“[c]omputing power and the accretion of third-party records” complicate Fourth Amendment search 
determinations); Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth 
Amendment, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1441, 1495 (2015) (criticizing the application of the third-party doc-
trine because “[i]n an increasingly connected world, choosing not to provide personal information via 
credit cards, cell phones, the Internet, and other media through a corporate third-party intermediary is 
not a viable option”); Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 
643, 673 (2013) (arguing that “[t]he danger of the [third-party] doctrine is even more apparent today” 
because of the prevalence of information “transmitted to third-party Internet service providers, search 
engines, email servers, and others”); Porter, supra note 32, at 1803–10 (discussing privacy concerns 
over an individual’s cell-site location data and arguing that the third-party doctrine should be “re-
formed” to account for privacy interests created by advances in technology). 
 79 See Porter, supra note 32, at 1790 (discussing how the application of the third-party doctrine 
has not changed since Smith). 
 80 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 316–19 (describing the sequential approach to Fourth Amendment 
search determinations); Lucier, supra note 23, at 1811 (describing how courts adjudicate Fourth 
Amendment disputes); supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (describing the reasonableness re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
 81 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; William Clark, Note, Protecting the Privacies of Digital Life: Riley 
v. California, the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement, and Search Protocols for Cell-
phone Search Warrants, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1981, 1996 (2015) (discussing the Riley decision). The Riley 
Court did not address whether the government’s conduct amounted to a Fourth Amendment search. 
Potapchuk, supra note 21, at 1413 n.58 (explaining that the sole question before the Riley Court was 
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In Riley, the government arrested the petitioner after a routine traffic stop 
resulted in the discovery of drugs, firearms, and materials evidencing gang activ-
ity.82 The government lawfully seized the petitioner’s cell phone during the ar-
rest and later searched it without a warrant.83 On appeal, the Court was tasked 
with deciding whether or not the warrantless search was reasonable by way of 
falling within the search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant re-
quirement.84 The Court held that, although searches incident to an arrest general-
ly do not require a warrant, this “categorical exception” should not apply to the 
“digital contents” contained within “physical objects,” such as cell phones, and 
therefore held the warrantless search to be unreasonable.85 
Central to the Court’s holding was the conclusion that the digital data con-
tained within a cell phone does not implicate the twin dangers that the search 
incident to arrest exception seeks to guard against.86 First, the digital data itself 
poses no physical danger to law enforcement at the time of the arrest.87 Second, 
                                                                                                                           
whether or not the government’s search of the cell phone fell within the search incident to arrest war-
rant exception). Indeed, it seems that it was conceded that the government’s conduct was a Fourth 
Amendment search. See Turner, 839 F. 3d at 434 n.2 (explaining that there was “no dispute” among 
the parties that by examining the contents of the phone, the government committed a search under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 82 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. Riley decided two cases that had been consolidated for appeal. Id. at 
2473. The other case had a similar factual record, as the respondent, Wurie, had his cell phone seized 
and searched. Id. at 2481. Information contained in the cell phone was then used to secure a search 
warrant for an apartment that contained evidence of Wurie’s involvement in a drug distribution 
scheme. Id. 
 83 Id. at 2480. The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion to suppress the information taken from 
the cell phone and the California Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that accessing the contents of the 
cell phone fell within the “search incident to arrest” warrant exception. Id. at 2481. Riley subsequently 
appealed. Id. 
 84 Id. at 2482. 
 85 Id. at 2484–85. The Court thoroughly summarized its precedent with respect to searches inci-
dent to an arrest. See id. at 2482–84. The Court explained that in 1969, in Chimel v. California, the 
Court concluded that searches incident to a lawful arrest were reasonable if a given search was neces-
sary to remove objects that may pose a danger to the arresting officer’s safety. Id. at 2482 (citing 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)). The Chimel Court further concluded that search-
es incident to an arrest were allowable when they would aid in preventing the “concealment or de-
struction” of evidence. Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63). The Riley Court next discussed the 
Court’s decisions in 1973 in United States v. Robinson and in 1991 in United States v. Chadwick 
which held that a search incident to an arrest may be reasonable with respect to “personal property . . . 
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee” even though there is no danger of loss of evi-
dence or harm to the arresting officer. Id. at 2483–84 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 
15 (1977)). 
 86 See id. at 2485–88 (concluding that digital data does not implicate the policy concerns behind 
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement). The Chimel Court concluded that 
the search incident to arrest exception was necessary to protect arresting police officers and preserve 
the evidence that may be found upon an arrest. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
 87 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–86. The Court explained that digital data “cannot itself be used as a 
weapon to harm an arresting officer.” Id. at 2485. The Court juxtaposed the digital contents of a cell 
phone with the cigarette pack confiscated and searched in Robinson, concluding that because the ar-
resting officer could not have known whether the physical objects contained in the cigarette pack 
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there is minimal risk that an arrestee will be able to “conceal or destroy” evi-
dence within the digital data once the cell phone has been confiscated.88 Addi-
tionally, the Court found that the modern cell phone’s substantial storage capa-
bility and the sensitive personal information typically contained therein creates a 
privacy interest that far outweighs any perceived government interest in search-
ing the cell phone.89 The Court therefore held that that the warrantless search of 
the cell phone was unreasonable.90 
Because the Riley Court tailored the holding to the propriety of warrantless 
cell phone searches, it therefore left open the constitutionality of warrantless 
searches of other types of physical objects capable of storing digital data.91 In 
July 2015, in United States v. Bah, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the government’s act of scanning the magnetic stripe of a card to 
access the data contained therein is not a Fourth Amendment search.92 In so do-
ing, the Sixth Circuit became the first circuit to address this issue.93 Soon after, 
the Eighth Circuit, in June 2016 in United States v. DE L’Isle, the Fifth Circuit, 
in October 2016 in United States v. Turner, and the First Circuit, in May 2017 in 
United States v. Hillaire, followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead and similarly held that 
scanning a card is not a Fourth Amendment search.94 
II. THE CARD CONUNDRUM: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF DIGITAL 
STORAGE DEVICES POST-RILEY 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits 
uniformly concluded that swiping the magnetic stripe of a card is not a search 
                                                                                                                           
could have been harmful, it was reasonable to search the contents of the pack. Id.; see United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). Not so in the case of a cell phone, the Riley Court held, as the 
digital data within the cell phone posed no physical harm to the arresting officers because they “knew 
exactly what they would find therein: data.” 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (quoting United States v. Wurie, 728 
F. 3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013)). 
 88 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486–88. 
 89 Id. at 2488–91. 
 90 Id. at 2493. 
 91 See id. (tailoring the holding to warrantless searches of cell phones); Katharine Saphner, Note, 
You Should Be Free to Talk the Talk and Walk the Walk: Applying Riley v. California to Smart Activi-
ty Trackers, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1689, 1705–06 (2016) (discussing post-Riley decisions that have 
sought to determine the authority of conducting warrantless searches of digital storage devices). 
 92 Bah, 794 F.3d at 621; see Orin Kerr, Opinion, Is Credit Card Skimming a Fourth Amendment 
Search?, WASH. POST (July 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/07/29/is-credit-card-skimming-a-fourth-amendment-search/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.10220e
449428 [https://perma.cc/T6U8-DFQK] (describing the Bah case). 
 93 Bah, 794 F.3d at 631–32. 
 94 Hillaire, 857 F.3d at 130; Turner, 839 F.3d at 434; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431–33. DE L’Isle’s 
subsequent motion for a rehearing en banc was denied. United States v. DE L’Isle, No. 15-01316, slip 
op. at 1 (8th Cir. July 22, 2016). 
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.95 In order to reach their respec-
tive conclusions, each court applied the analysis set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1967, in Katz v. United States.96 In each case, the court found that the 
appellants were categorically precluded from claiming a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the information encoded on the magnetic stripes of the cards.97 
Moreover, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2014 decision in Riley v. California further supported the finding that an indi-
vidual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information en-
coded on cards.98 Section A examines the Bah, DE L’Isle, and Turner courts’ 
application of the Katz analysis.99 Section B examines the Bah and Turner 
courts’ consideration of the Riley decision.100 
A. Not So Great Expectations: The Data Encoded on Cards  
Fails the Katz Standard 
In adjudicating the appellants’ claims, the Bah, DE L’Isle, and Turner 
courts each had to make the threshold determination of whether or not the gov-
ernment’s conduct constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.101 To do 
this, the courts applied the analysis set forth in Katz.102 Subsection 1 examines 
the Sixth Circuit’s application of the Katz standard in 2015 in United States v. 
Bah.103 Subsection 2 examines the Eighth Circuit’s application of the Katz 
standard in 2016 in United States v. DE L’Isle.104 Subsection 3 examines the 
Fifth Circuit’s application of the Katz standard in 2016 in United States v. 
Turner.105 
                                                                                                                           
 95 United States v. Hillaire, 857 F.3d 128, 130 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Turner, 839 F.3d 
429, 435 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d 426, 431–33 (8th Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 630 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Harvey v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 561 (2015). 
 96 See Hillaire, 857 F.3d at 130 (applying Katz v. United States analysis); Turner, 839 F.3d at 
434–35 (same); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431–33 (same); Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–32 (same). 
 97 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–35; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431–33; Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–32. 
 98 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632–33. 
 99 See infra notes 101–137 and accompanying text. As mentioned supra, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hillaire will not be analyzed in this Part. See 
supra note 19. 
 100 See infra notes 138–150 and accompanying text. 
 101 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431–33; Bah, 794 F.3d at 630. 
 102 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–35 (applying the Katz analysis); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431–33 
(same); Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–32 (same). 
 103 See infra notes 106–123 and accompanying text. 
 104 See infra notes 124–132 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 133–137 and accompanying text. 
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1. United States v. Bah 
In United States v. Bah, law enforcement arrested the driver of a car, Bah, 
for driving with a suspended license.106 Following the arrest, the government 
searched the vehicle.107 Approximately seventy cards were discovered and then 
seized.108 Law enforcement brought the seized cards back to the police station 
and—without a warrant—scanned them through the station’s magnetic card 
reader to determine if the electronic account information encoded on the magnet-
ic stripes matched the account numbers embossed on the face of each corre-
sponding card.109 The scans revealed that the encoded information did not match 
the information embossed on the cards.110 The cards were therefore determined 
to be fraudulent and Bah was charged and convicted.111 
Before trial, Bah moved to suppress the evidence from the station’s mag-
netic card reader.112 Bah argued that the warrantless scans of these cards violated 
his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches.113 After the district 
court denied Bah’s motion, Bah entered a conditional guilty plea and the trial 
judge sentenced him to ten months in prison.114 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that, under Katz, the government’s scans of the suspected fraudulent 
cards were not Fourth Amendment searches.115 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Bah, 794 F.3d at 622. 
 107 Id. Bah’s passenger, Allen Harvey, was not placed under arrest at the scene, but nonetheless 
was escorted back to the police station for questioning. Id. After a search of Harvey’s wallet, several 
credit cards were found. Id. After the cards were deemed to be fraudulent, Harvey was arrested. Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 623. As the court in Bah, as well as subsequent courts, explained, upon scanning the 
magnetic stripe of a credit, debit, or gift card (collectively, “cards”) in a magnetic card reader, a num-
ber of different types of information will appear. Id. This information includes the card’s “account 
number, bank identification number . . . the card expiration date, the three digit ‘CSC’ code, and the 
cardholder’s first and last name.” Id.; see Turner, 839 F.3d at 435–36 (describing electronic infor-
mation contained within the magnetic stripe of gift cards); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 430 (describing 
electronic information contained within the magnetic stripe of gift cards). Typically, a card that con-
tains electronic information that is different from the information embossed on the face of the card 
indicates that the card is fraudulent. Turner, 839 F.3d at 436. 
 110 Bah, 794 F.3d at 623. 
 111 Id. Bah and his passenger, Harvey, were charged with the “production, use, or trafficking in 
counterfeit access devices.” Id. at 624. 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 625. The magistrate judge made the initial ruling on Bah’s motion and found that there 
was no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The district court then adopted the 
magistrate’s findings. Id. 
 115 Id. at 630. Consistent with Jones, the Bah court concluded that the scanning of the cards did 
not constitute a search under the trespass-based approach to Fourth Amendment search determinations 
because they did not involve a “physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.” See id.; see 
also supra note 45 (discussing how Katz did not replace the “trespass-based” approach to Fourth 
Amendment determinations but rather supplemented it). In making this determination, the Bah court 
reasoned that because the confiscated cards were lawfully possessed by law enforcement, there could 
not have been a physical trespass. See Bah, 794 F.3d at 630 (citing United States v. Alabi, 943 F. 
1106 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1089 
The Bah court began the two-pronged Katz analysis by first addressing the 
subjective inquiry.116 Consistent with the practice of many other courts, however, 
the Bah court assumed the subjective prong was satisfied for the purposes of 
addressing the next prong of the Katz analysis.117 
The court then analyzed the objective prong and concluded that Bah’s ex-
pectation of privacy was unreasonable because it was not one that “society is 
prepared to consider reasonable.”118 Critical to the court’s holding was its con-
clusion that individuals are precluded from claiming a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in contraband and in objects, items, or information exposed to the pub-
lic.119 In the court’s view, regardless of whether the card was authentic or not, 
Bah retained no privacy interest in the information encoded on it. 120 The court 
reasoned that if the cards were authentic, the information encoded on the mag-
netic stripes would be no different from the information embossed on the cards 
themselves—information that is typically exposed to the public upon making 
purchases and readily visible to law enforcement upon seizure.121 Conversely, if 
the information encoded on the magnetic stripe was different, the information 
could be considered contraband.122 In either case, the court concluded, Bah 
would not be able to claim a legitimate privacy interest in the encoded infor-
mation.123 
2. United States v. DE L’Isle 
Similarly, in June 2016, in United States v. DE L’Isle, the Eighth Circuit 
held that warrantless scans of magnetic stripes of cards are not searches under 
the Fourth Amendment.124 Unlike the Bah court, however, the DE L’Isle court 
                                                                                                                           
Supp. 2d 1201, 1265 (D.N.M. 2013)). The court then went on to apply the Katz analysis. See id. at 
630–34. 
 116 Bah, 794 F.3d at 630. 
 117 Id. The court noted, however, that this assumption was not intended to imply that Bah had a 
strong argument in support of the subjective prong of the Katz analysis. See id. at 630 n.9 (noting that 
Bah’s claim to have had a subjective expectation of privacy in the information encoded on the mag-
netic stripe of the seized cards “is far from clear”). 
 118 Id. at 630. 
 119 Id. at 632. 
 120 See id. (“The question presented here lies at ‘an intersection . . . between the principle that 
there is no legitimate privacy interest in already known information, and . . . no legitimate privacy 
interest in contraband.’”) (quoting United States v. DE L’Isle, No. 4:14-CR-3089, 2014 WL 5431349, 
at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 24, 2014)). 
 121 Id. at 631–32. 
 122 Id. at 632.  
 123 Id. at 631–32. 
 124 DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 429–30. DE L’Isle involved a routine traffic stop that eventually led to the 
discovery of a large number of cards in the trunk of DE L’Isle’s vehicle. Id. at 429. The cards were turned 
over to the U.S. Secret Service for examination and, after scanning the cards without a warrant, many 
were identified as having been re-encoded with stolen account information. Id. Scans of some of the 
confiscated cards revealed that their magnetic stripes were “blank.” Id. In other words, the scans of the 
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did not merely assume that the appellant had a subjective expectation of priva-
cy in encoded information under Katz, but rather scrutinized that claim specifi-
cally. 125 It reasoned that because the use of a card necessarily requires the vol-
untary transfer of the account information encoded on the magnetic stripe to 
cashiers and the like, no subjective expectation of privacy in that content could 
be claimed.126 In effect, the court concluded that the third-party doctrine pre-
cluded DE L’Isle from claiming an expectation of privacy in the encoded in-
formation.127 
Next, the DE L’Isle court addressed the objective prong of the Katz analysis 
and held that even assuming that DE L’Isle could claim a subjective expectation 
of privacy, such an expectation would be unreasonable because it is not one that 
“society is prepared to endorse.”128 In this respect, the court’s analysis largely 
mirrored the analysis employed by the Sixth Circuit in Bah.129 The DE L’Isle 
court concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the encoded 
information, reasoning that if the cards were authentic, the information encod-
ed on the magnetic stripe would have mirrored the information embossed on 
the card and thus would be exposed to the public.130 Alternatively, if the encod-
ed information was different from the information embossed on the card, the 
information would be considered contraband.131 Under either analysis, the court 
                                                                                                                           
cards turned up no account information at all, thereby indicating that the cards were fraudulent and 
were capable of later becoming encoded with stolen account information. Id. at 430. DE L’Isle prompt-
ly moved to suppress the evidence of the card readings under the theory that the warrantless scans violat-
ed his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. Id. at 429–30. The district court denied 
the motion and held that the scans were not searches under the Fourth Amendment. Id. After being con-
victed at trial, DE L’Isle appealed to the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 430. Unlike Bah, however, DE L’Isle was 
decided over a dissent. See id. at 433–37 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case should be re-
manded for further “factual development” to be able to make an appropriate determination on whether 
DE L’Isle had a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 125 Id. at 432 (majority opinion) (assessing whether DE L’Isle had a subjective expectation of 
privacy). Prior to addressing the Katz standard, the DE L’Isle court first disposed of the theory that 
scanning a card to reveal the encoded account information would be considered a search under the 
trespass-based approach to Fourth Amendment search determinations. Id. at 431–32. The court found 
this argument unavailing, reasoning that scanning a credit card “‘does not involve physically invading 
a person’s’ space or property.” Id. at 431 (quoting United States v. Medina, 09-20717-CR, 2009 WL 
3669636, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2009). 
 126 Id. at 432. 
 127 See id. (quoting Medina, 2009 WL 3669636, at *10) (“When the holder uses the card[,] he 
‘knowingly disclose[s] the information on the magnetic strip of his credit card to a third party and 
cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.’”). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id.; Bah, 794 F.3d at 631–32. 
 130 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432 (holding that individuals cannot reasonably expect privacy in 
information that is put into “plain view” such that “any member of the public may see” it). 
 131 See id. at 432–33 (“[G]overnmental conduct that only reveals the presence of contraband 
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 
(2005)). 
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held that DE L’Isle could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
encoded information.132 
3. United States v. Turner 
Several months after the DE L’Isle decision, in October 2016, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Turner, followed the Sixth and Eighth Circuits by hold-
ing that the government’s scans of the magnetic stripes of confiscated gift cards 
were not searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.133 Similar to 
the Bah court, the Turner court did not address the issue of whether or not Turner 
had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the information encoded 
on the gift cards.134 Rather, the court rested its holding on the conclusion that 
Turner failed to meet the objective prong of the Katz analysis.135 Central to the 
court’s conclusion was the fact that the functional purpose of gift cards was to be 
swiped by third parties.136 The court reasoned that because information encoded 
on the magnetic stripe of a gift card is regularly disclosed to third parties at the 
time of a purchase, the third-party doctrine precluded Turner from exercising a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.137 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Id. at 433. The majority ruled over a dissent. Id. at 433– 35 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The dissent-
ing justice dissented on the grounds that the case needed further factual development before a deter-
mination of a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz could be made. Id. at 433. The dissent 
focused on the fact that a credit card may be appropriately described as a “digital storage device,” 
which the U.S. Supreme Court has held to require a warrant before searching. Id. at 434 (citing Riley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014), United States v. Makeeff, 820 F.3d 995, 1002–03 (8th 
Cir. 2016), United States v. Beckmann, 786 F.3d 672, 677–78 (8th Cir. 2015), and United States v. 
Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 447–48 (8th Cir. 2008)). The dissent took further issue with the majority’s 
reasoning that no privacy interest exists in information that constitutes illegal conduct. Id. at 434–35. 
The dissent argued that this reasoning was flawed because the illegality of the card is only revealed 
once the card has been scanned by law enforcement. Id. at 434 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 114 n.9 (1984) and United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
 133 Turner, 839 F.3d at 433–37. As with Bah and DE L’Isle, Turner involved a suspect who was 
arrested following a routine traffic violation. See id. at 431 (involving a vehicle pulled over for a faulty 
license plate light); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 429 (involving vehicle pulled over for tailgating); Bah, 794 
F.3d at 621 (involving a vehicle pulled over for speeding). After the vehicle was pulled over, the police 
officer determined that the passenger of the vehicle—Turner—had an outstanding arrest warrant. Turner, 
839 F.3d at 431. Law enforcement placed Turner in the police car and a subsequent search of the vehicle 
revealed the presence of a bag containing approximately 100 gift cards. Id. The cards were eventually 
turned over to the U.S. Secret Service and scanned without a warrant to determine their authenticity. Id. 
at 431–32. Following the scans, approximately forty of the cards were deemed fraudulent. Id. at 432. 
Turner moved to suppress this evidence by arguing that the scans of the cards constituted unreasonable 
searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The district court denied Turner’s motion and held 
that the scans were not Fourth Amendment searches. Id. Turner entered a conditional guilty plea and 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Id. 
 134 Turner, 839 F.3d at 435–36. 
 135 Id. at 436. 
 136 See id. (finding that “the raison d’être of gift cards means that third party cashiers will often be 
doing the same swiping that law enforcement did here”). 
 137 Id. 
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B. No Comparison: The Bah and Turner Courts’ Consideration  
of Riley v. California 
In addition to performing the Katz analysis, the Bah and Turner courts 
each addressed the petitioners’ respective arguments that scans of cards should 
require a warrant under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 ruling in Riley v. Cali-
fornia.138 Critical to each court’s analysis was a discussion of whether the in-
formation encoded on a magnetic stripe is sufficiently private or personal 
enough in nature to create a privacy interest similar to the privacy interest in 
cellphones recognized in Riley.139 
The Bah court distinguished the case before it from Riley by focusing on 
the difference in storage capacity between a magnetic stripe of a card and a cell 
phone.140 To highlight this difference, the court summarized the technical as-
pects of a magnetic stripe.141 The court explained that a magnetic stripe of a 
card contains three lines of data, each containing 79 alphanumeric characters, 
40 numeric characters, and 107 numeric characters, respectively.142 Additional-
ly, the court emphasized that the data actually encoded on a card typically 
matches the information embossed on the front of the card.143 Thus, in the 
court’s view, such information is not of such a “highly personal” character that 
one would seek to keep private.144 In contrast, the court noted, modern cell-
phones are capable of storing large swaths of private and sensitive information 
in a variety of formats far exceeding the capabilities of a magnetic stripe.145 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the limited data storage capacity of the 
magnetic stripe was insufficient to create a privacy interest similar to other 
digital storage devices such as cell phones or computers.146 The court therefore 
held that the Riley decision did not allow individuals to claim a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the information encoded on a magnetic stripe.147 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Id.; Bah, 794 F.3d at 631. The DE L’Isle court did not address this argument. See generally 
DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 430–33 (failing to discuss any relevance of the Riley decision). The dissent, 
however, did address the pertinence of Riley to the case before it. See id. at 434–35 (Kelly, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing how courts have previously held that a warrant must be obtained before searching 
digital storage devices). 
 139 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–35; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632–33. 
 140 See Bah, 794 F.3d at 633 (“The storage capacity of the magnetic strip of a credit, debit or gift 
card pales in comparison to that of a computer hard drive, cell phone, or even audiocassette.”). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. But see Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (describing credit and debit cards as only containing 
“two tracks of stored data”). 
 143 Bah, 794 F.3d at 631. 
 144 Id. at 633. 
 145 Id. at 632–33 (“The storage capacity of the magnetic strip of a credit, debit or gift card pales in 
comparison to that of a . . . cell phone . . . .”). 
 146 Id. at 633. 
 147 Id. The court explained, however, that their holding was “limited in scope” and is not intended 
to reach new types of cards with greater storage capacity that may be developed in the future. Id. at 
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in Turner, held that although Riley established a 
warrant requirement for lawfully seized digital storage devices like cell phones, 
it does not apply to digital storage devices with the minimal storage capacity of 
the magnetic stripe of a gift card.148 The Turner court emphasized the lack of 
personal information contained within the magnetic stripe of the card, conclud-
ing that the three data strips of electronic data—first and last name of the card 
holder, CSC code, bank identification number, and card number—were not 
nearly as personal or private as the information contained within a cell 
phone.149 Because the information revealed in a scan is minimally invasive, as 
compared to a search of a cell phone, the court held that individuals cannot 
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information encoded on a 
magnetic stripe of a lawfully seized card.150 
III. LET’S BE REASONABLE: SCANS OF CARDS ARE  
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES 
Collectively, the Bah, DE L’Isle, and Turner courts rested their conclusions 
that a scan of the magnetic stripe of a lawfully seized card is not a Fourth 
Amendment search on two main grounds.151 First, the three courts held that the 
categorical preclusions to claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy applied 
to the information encoded on magnetic stripes.152 Second, the Bah and Turner 
courts held that, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 holding in Riley, the min-
imal storage capability of the cards could not give rise to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their contents.153 Section A argues that the courts erred in hold-
ing that the petitioners were precluded from claiming a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the information encoded on the cards’ magnetic stripes.154 Section B 
argues that the Riley decision should have played no part in the courts’ determi-
nation of whether or not scanning a card is a Fourth Amendment search.155 
                                                                                                                           
631. The DE L’Isle and Turner courts made similar qualifications. Turner, 839 F.3d at 436–37; DE 
L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 433. 
 148 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–35. 
 149 Id. at 435–36; see supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (describing the digital content con-
tained on magnetic stripes of cards). 
 150 Turner, 839 F.3d at 435–36. 
 151 United States v. Turner, 839 F.3d 429, 434–36 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. DE L’Isle, 825 
F.3d 426, 431–33 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 630–33 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied sub nom. Harvey v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 561 (2015). As with Part II of this Note, the First 
Circuit’s decision in Hillaire will not be analyzed in Part III due to its reliance on the reasoning of the 
Bah and DE L’Isle courts. See supra notes 19, 99. 
 152 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–36; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431–33; Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–33. 
 153 Turner, 839 F.3d at 435–36; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632–33. 
 154 See infra notes 156–196 and accompanying text. 
 155 See infra notes 197–213 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Preclusions 
The Bah, DE L’Isle, and Turner courts held that the categorical preclu-
sions to claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy applied to the infor-
mation encoded on magnetic stripes.156 Each court found that because the 
cards were either exposed to the public or voluntarily disclosed to third parties, 
the appellants could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information.157 Further, the Bah and DE L’Isle courts held that in the event that 
the encoded information is different from the information embossed on the 
cards, one could not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the infor-
mation because it would constitute contraband.158 Subsection 1 argues that the 
exposure of the physical cards to the public does not preclude an individual 
from claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information encoded 
on magnetic stripes.159 Subsection 2 argues that the courts’ application of Ca-
balles is misplaced.160 Subsection 3 argues that the third-party doctrine should 
not apply to the information encoded on magnetic stripes.161 
1. Public Exposure 
The Bah and DE L’Isle courts each implicitly held that because the cards 
were exposed to the public, the appellants could not have claimed a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the encoded information.162 Indeed, although the 
cards themselves may have been taken out of a wallet or bag and been exposed 
to the public, the exposure of the cards themselves does not, in and of itself, 
justify a search of their contents.163 The contents of a card are similar to the 
contents of other physical items—such as a suitcase.164 In either instance, the 
contents of the container, whether physical or digital, are not visible to the na-
                                                                                                                           
 156 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–36; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431–33; Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–33. 
 157 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–36; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 431–33; Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–33. 
 158 DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432–33; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632. 
 159 See infra notes 162–166 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 167–180 and accompanying text. 
 161 See infra notes 181–196 and accompanying text. 
 162 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432 (quoting United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1276 
(D.N.M. 2013) (finding that “[s]ociety is not prepared to recognize as legitimate an asserted privacy 
interest in information in plain view that any member of the public may see”); Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–
33. 
 163 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982) (noting that “the Fourth Amendment 
provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view[,]” and 
then describing instances where a warrantless search of a container’s contents may be reasonable); 
LAFAVE, supra note 32, at § 2.2(a) (noting that “the mere fact that [a] container itself is in plain view 
provides no basis for a warrantless seizure and search of it”). 
 164 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000) (holding that a bag exposed to the public 
on a public bus could not be searched without a warrant); United States v. Rivera-Padilla, 365 F. 
App’x 343, 345 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a warrantless search of a closed wallet was unreasona-
ble). 
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ked eye and cannot be known until the government acts in some way to expose 
them.165 Further, because the magnetic stripes are rewritable, the fact that cer-
tain information is embossed on the card provides no guarantee of what infor-
mation is actually encoded on the magnetic stripe.166 
2. Contraband 
The Bah and DE L’Isle courts further held that an individual does not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in encoded information when it dif-
fers from the information embossed on the front and back of the corresponding 
card.167 In the courts’ view, when the sets of information differ, the encoded 
information must be contraband.168 In support of this conclusion, the courts 
cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes that held that a 
police dog’s sniff of a vehicle was not a Fourth Amendment search because the 
sniff could only have resulted in the identification of contraband.169 
In Caballes, the police dog performing the sniff was trained specifically 
to identify the presence of contraband.170 This specific training ensured that the 
police dog would not erroneously trigger a search that would reveal legal ac-
tivity.171 Because dog sniffs would not reveal the presence of lawful activity, 
the Court characterized them as “sui generis” and held that they were not 
Fourth Amendment searches.172 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Bond, 529 U.S. at 336 (describing how the contents of the bag would not be revealed until 
it was searched by law enforcement); Rivera-Padilla, 365 F. App’x at 346 (describing how incriminat-
ing evidence was not discovered in the wallet until it was opened and searched by law enforcement); 
see also DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that “it is only possible to determine 
whether the information on the magnetic stripe is blank or matches the information embossed on the 
front of the card by scanning the magnetic stripe to determine its contents”). 
 166 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that a magnetic stripe may be re-
encoded to store any kind of information). 
 167 Id. at 432–33; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632. 
 168 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 433 (finding that “because scanning the magnetic strips [sic] on the 
cards was the government’s way of revealing DE L’Isle’s possession of contraband, the counterfeit 
cards, there was no violation of a legitimate privacy interest and accordingly, no search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment”); Bah, 794 F.3d at 632 (quoting Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 1273) 
(noting that “either the information disclosed is the same information on the outside of the credit and 
debit cards, or is information about a different account, used to commit credit card fraud”). 
 169 DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 433; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 
409–10 (2005). 
 170 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. 
 171 See id. (finding that “[a]lthough respondent argues that the error rates, particularly the exist-
ence of false positives, call into question the premise that drug-detection dogs alert only to contra-
band, the record contains no evidence or findings that support his argument”). 
 172 Id. Emphasizing that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the presence of 
lawful activity, the Caballes Court distinguished the case before it from its 2001 decision in Kyllo v. 
United States. Id. at 409–10. The Kyllo Court held that law enforcement’s use of thermal technology 
to reveal the presence of heat lamps used to grow marijuana constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001). The Caballes Court concluded that 
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Relying on Caballes, the Bah and DE L’Isle courts concluded that indi-
viduals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information en-
coded on a magnetic stripe when the information is different from what is em-
bossed on the front and back of the card.173 The courts’ premise that encoded 
information is contraband whenever it differs from the embossed information 
is flawed, however, and their reliance on Caballes is therefore misplaced.174 
Unlike the sui generis nature of a dog sniff, a scan of the magnetic stripe 
of a card may very well reveal the presence of lawful activity.175 Magnetic 
stripes are capable of being re-encoded with any type of information.176 De-
pending on how the stripe is re-encoded, the scan could reveal re-encoded in-
formation distinct from the information embossed on the card that was none-
theless not contraband.177 Regardless of the likelihood that an individual would 
re-encode a magnetic stripe with anything other than stolen account infor-
mation, exactly what information is encoded on a magnetic stripe is not known 
to the government unless and until the card is scanned.178 At the time of the 
scan the government does not know what information will be revealed.179 This 
                                                                                                                           
because the search in Kyllo could have revealed the presence of “lawful activity” in the home, the 
individual whose home was searched had a reasonable expectation that his or her “lawful activity 
w[ould] remain private.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10. The disputed search in Caballes, however, 
was distinguishable because the dog’s sniff could not have revealed lawful activity. Id. at 410. 
 173 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432–33 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408) (finding that “govern-
mental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest’”); Bah, 794 F.3d at 632. 
 174 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the DE L’Isle majority 
opinion from Caballes); Kerr, supra note 92 (arguing that Caballes should not apply to cases dealing 
with scans of credit or debit cards); see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410–13 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting on the grounds that it is not conclusive that police dogs can perform sniffs without creating 
false positive results). 
 175 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (discussing how a magnetic stripe may 
be re-encoded to potentially include non-incriminating information); Kerr, supra note 92 (providing 
examples of how a magnetic stripe may be re-encoded to contain information that is neither identical 
to the information embossed on the card nor contraband). 
 176 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (discussing how a magnetic stripe may 
be re-encoded to store any information); Kerr, supra note 92 (providing examples of how a magnetic 
stripe may be re-encoded with information that is not contraband). 
 177 Kerr, supra note 92 (noting that scanning a card can “reveal[] non-contraband data that could 
be anything. The magstripe is just a small electronic storage device that can be programmed, within its 
technical parameters, to contain any information the encoder wants it to contain . . . . [I]t’s still infor-
mation that could say anything”). 
 178 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 431–35 (describing how cards are revealed to be fraudulent only upon 
scanning them); Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 1211–12; see also DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435 (Kelly, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that scans are Fourth Amendment searches even if there is only a small likelihood 
that the stripes would be rewritten with information that was neither stolen account information nor 
the information embossed on the cards); Kerr, supra note 92 (explaining that “[scanning cards] reveals 
non-contraband data that could be anything”). 
 179 See DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (arguing that “it is only possible to de-
termine whether the information on the magnetic stripe is blank or matches the information embossed 
on the front of the card by scanning the magnetic stripe to determine its contents”); Kerr, supra note 
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type of search is exactly what the Fourth Amendment seeks to prevent and Ca-
balles is therefore inapplicable to the scans of cards.180 
3. Third-Party Doctrine 
The Bah, DE L’Isle, and Turner courts each implicitly held that the third-
party doctrine precludes an individual from claiming a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the information encoded on the magnetic stripes of cards.181 The 
courts concluded that because cards—and by operation, the encoded infor-
mation—are regularly disclosed to third party merchants at the time of a pur-
chase, the card holder is precluded from claiming a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the encoded information.182 
As a threshold matter, it is not clear in any of the cases if the seized cards 
had ever been used by the appellants and thus it is not clear if the encoded in-
formation had ever actually been voluntarily disclosed to a third party.183 The 
courts nevertheless applied the third-party doctrine, reasoning that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the encoded information because the pur-
pose of such cards necessarily requires that they be turned over to third party 
merchants in order to complete transactions.184 The third-party doctrine cannot 
apply, however, when no disclosure to third parties has definitively been 
made.185 That the cards were intended to be used and that their encoded infor-
                                                                                                                           
92 (arguing that Caballes cannot apply to cases of scans of credit or debit cards); see also Caballes, 
543 U.S. 410–13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a police dog’s sniff was a Fourth Amendment 
search because “[t]he infallible dog . . . is a creature of legal fiction[,]” and the government therefore 
could not guarantee that lawful activity would not be revealed from a sniff that resulted in a “false 
positive”). 
 180 Kerr, supra note 92 (arguing that “[t]he police can’t know [what information will be revealed] 
until they [scan] the card, and that means Caballes can’t apply”); see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 114, 114 n.9 (1984) (holding that a warrantless search is not made reasonable by discover-
ing contraband, and citing to several cases holding the same); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435 (Kelly, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “the results of a search cannot be used to justify its legality”). 
 181 Turner, 839 F.3d at 436; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432; Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–32. Although only 
the Turner court referred to the third-party doctrine by name, the Bah and DE L’Isle courts each cited 
to portions of district court opinions that discussed the third-party doctrine at length. See Turner, 839 
F.3d at 436; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432; Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–31. 
 182 Turner, 839 F.3d at 436; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432; Bah, 794 F.3d at 630–32. 
 183 Turner, 839 F.3d at 431–34; DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432; Bah, 794 F.3d at 621–26. The Bah 
court expressly noted the lack of direct evidence on this point. Bah, 794 F.3d at 630 n.9. 
 184 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 436 (finding that “the raison d’être of gift cards means that third party 
cashiers will often be doing the same swiping that law enforcement did here”); DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 
432 (quoting United States v. Medina, No. 09-20717-CR, 2009 WL 3669636, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 
24, 2009) (finding that “[w]hen the holder uses the card he ‘knowingly disclose[s] the information on 
the magnetic strip of his credit card to a third party and cannot claim a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in it.’”); Bah, 794 F.3d at 632. 
 185 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (finding that “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties”) (emphasis added); 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 
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mation was therefore intended to be disclosed to third parties is of no conse-
quence.186 
Even assuming that these cards were used, however, the third-party doc-
trine should not apply to the information encoded on the magnetic stripes of 
cards.187 As with cell phones and other technological devices, the ubiquity of 
credit and debit card use today necessarily means that millions of Americans 
are regularly forced to use them in day-to-day life.188 This necessity in turn 
requires individuals to hand over their card—and therefore the encoded ac-
count information—to third parties on a near daily basis.189 At the same time 
                                                                                                                           
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities”); Kerr, supra note 68, at 563 (noting that the third-party doctrine involves a disclosure of 
information to third parties); see also Monu Bedi, The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: 
Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 75 (2015), https://scholarly
commons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1231&context=nulr_online [https://
perma.cc/4RPP-C58X] (arguing that the third-party doctrine does not apply in a hypothetical situation 
where no disclosure has been made by the individual claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy); 
Kerr, supra note 92 (arguing that “the fact that the [encoded] information . . . might in the future be 
disclosed [] does not eliminate Fourth Amendment protection”). 
 186 See Smith, 442 U.S at 743–44 (noting that information is “turn[ed] over” when the third-party 
doctrine applies); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (noting that information has been “revealed” to third parties 
when the third-party doctrine applies); Orin Kerr, Opinion, Fifth Circuit Rules on Whether Scanning 
the Magnetic Stripe on a Card Is a Search, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/10/16/fifth-circuit-rules-on-whether-scanning-magnetic-
stripe-on-a-card-is-a-search/?utm_term=.985820e6f87a [https://perma.cc/CC86-6Y8E] (arguing that 
expectation of privacy is not waived unless disclosure occurs). 
 187 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (criticiz-
ing the third-party doctrine on the grounds that individuals regularly turn over information to third 
parties in day-to-day life); Constitutional Law—State Action—Ninth Circuit Rejects Due Process 
Limit on Credit Card Fees, 128 HARV. L. REV. 751, 757 (2014) (citing Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee 
Litig., 741 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (describing credit cards as a 
“practical necessit[y] of modern life”); Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s 
Different Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 52 (2013) https://www.stanfordlaw
review.org/online/privacy-and-big-data-buying-and-selling-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/AG7X-FB34] 
(describing credit cards as a “necessity[y] of modern life”). 
 188 See State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 827 (Wis. 2014) (finding that “[i]n the modern world . . . 
we regularly disclose information to third parties as part of everyday life”); Jamie Gonzales-Garcia, 
Credit Card Ownership Statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.creditcards.com/
credit-card-news/ownership-statistics.php [https://perma.cc/Y2AD-K68L] (discussing 2015 statistics 
indicating that at least 70% of consumers own at least one credit card); see also City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (observing that cell phones are so commonplace in American society 
that they have become “essential” to modern life); Constitutional Law—State Action—Ninth Circuit 
Rejects Due Process Limit on Credit Card Fees, supra note 187, at 757 (citing Late Fee & Over-Limit 
Fee Litig., 741 F.3d at 1028 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)) (describing credit cards as a “practical neces-
sit[y] of modern life”); Jerome, supra note 187, at 52 (describing credit cards as a “necessit[y] of 
modern life”); Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens’s Fourth Amend-
ment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1736 (2006) (noting that individuals regularly disclose “a trove of 
information about [them]selves to third parties on a daily basis”). 
 189 See Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third 
Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 435 (2013) (“We now live in a world of ubiquitous third 
party information . . . . More and more people, and in more and more places, pay in an identified and 
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that these individuals are forced to disclose their card information to third par-
ty merchants in order to participate in today’s economy, they are simultaneous-
ly advised by their banks, lending companies, and even the government, that 
the information contained on and within their cards is highly sensitive infor-
mation that should be closely guarded.190 
This paradox highlights the fact that the third-party doctrine, as it is cur-
rently applied, is “ill suited for the digital age.”191 Indeed, the type of infor-
mation encoded on the magnetic stripe seems intuitively to be exactly the type 
of information that society would reasonably expect to remain private.192 Soci-
etal expectations of privacy are drastically different than in 1979 when the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Smith v. Maryland and, accordingly, courts should 
adapt their understanding.193 Although until recently the third-party doctrine 
had not been directly before the Supreme Court in decades, there are indica-
tions that the Supreme Court may soon opt in favor of a more narrow applica-
                                                                                                                           
recorded manner.”); Gonzales-Garcia, supra note 188 (discussing 2015 statistics indicating that at 
least 70% of consumers own at least one credit card). 
 190 See, e.g., Checking & Savings Account Security from Bank of America, BANK OF AMERICA 
(2017), https://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/accounts-cards/credit-debit-card-security.go [https://
perma.cc/G8QZ-A7PB] (discussing security of debit and credit card account information and suggest-
ing steps to maintain the privacy of the information); Protecting Against Credit Card Fraud, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (July 2012), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0216-protecting-against-credit-
card-fraud [https://perma.cc/AW7A-8WA7] (describing steps to take to ensure that credit and debit 
card account information remains protected). 
 191 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Citing the fact that modern 
technology has led to an increased need to disclose personal and private information to third parties in 
everyday life, Justice Sotomayor argued that she “would not assume that all information voluntarily 
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.” See id. at 418. 
 192 Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 159 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015) (characterizing credit and debit 
card numbers as “personal information”); Slot Speaker Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-CV-01161-
HSG(DMR), 2017 WL 386345, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2017) (ordering excerpts of a filed brief to be 
sealed because it disclosed “private information . . . such as credit card numbers”); Guarisma v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., No. 15-24326-CIV, 2016 WL 4017196, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2016) (citing Creative 
Hosp. Ventures, Inc. v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2009)) (characteriz-
ing credit card numbers as “private financial information”); Chapman v. Krutonog, No. CIV. 08-
00579 HG-LEK, 2010 WL 727577, at *5 (D. Haw. Feb. 26, 2010) (recognizing the existence of “a 
privacy interest in financial information such as . . . credit card numbers”); State v. Mank, No. CAAP-
16-0000342, 2017 WL 432898, at *3 (Haw. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2017) (finding that “an individual also 
has a significant privacy interest in protecting against the unauthorized possession of his or her credit 
card number”). 
 193 See, e.g., Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 698 
(2014) (describing that the courts are out of touch with “society’s current expectations of privacy”); 
Henderson, supra note 189, at 453–54 (describing that, in response to the third-party doctrine, state 
legislatures passed laws in the “1960s, 1970s, and 1980s” to guard against warrantless searches of 
banking and telephone records because “reasonable persons did expect privacy”); Christopher Slobo-
gin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 333–36 (2008) 
(describing a study that found respondents believed that the government’s access to data disclosed to 
third parties, such as “credit card records[,]” “email addresses sent to and received from[,]” and “bank 
records[,]” would be more intrusive than a “search of a car[,]” a “patdown[,]” or a “roadblock”). 
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tion.194 The economic and technological realties of the day should not work to 
frustrate an individual’s Fourth Amendment protections.195 Instead, as they have 
for other aspects of Fourth Amendment considerations, the courts should adapt 
the application of the third-party doctrine in light of today’s technology.196 
B. Riley’s (Ir)Relevancy to Cards 
In holding that the minimal storage capability of the cards could not give 
rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy in their contents, the Bah and 
Turner courts distinguished the privacy interests at stake in cell phones from 
the privacy interests at stake in cards.197 The Bah and Turner courts’ considera-
tion of the Riley holding, however, is misplaced.198 
The threshold issue before the Bah and Turner courts was whether or not 
scanning the magnetic stripes of cards was, in fact, a search under the Fourth 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Carpenter v. United States, (No. 16-402) (addressing 
whether the act of obtaining a cell phone user’s cell-site location data without a warrant violates the 
Fourth Amendment); see also, Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that “it may 
be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”); Henderson, supra note 189, 438–42 (collecting 
Supreme Court cases that have addressed Fourth Amendment search determinations over the last 
twenty years and arguing that they indicate the Court’s tendency to “sh[y] away from applying a 
strong third party doctrine”). Although the Carpenter case will address cell-site location data, the 
Court has an opportunity to re-work the application of the third-party doctrine in light of modern 
technological advances. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Carpenter v. United States, (No. 16-402). 
During the oral argument in Carpenter, Justice Alito acknowledged that “new technology is raising 
very serious privacy concerns” and noted that an issue in the case is “how much of existing [third-
party doctrine] precedent [the petitioner] wants us to overrule or declare obsolete.” Id. Moreover, the 
difficulty of applying the third-party doctrine in the modern-day was noted by Justice Breyer. Id. at 
17–22 (“[T]he law is at the moment [that] third-party information [belongs to the] third-party, with a 
few exceptions, but it may be that here another exception should exist for the reason that the technolo-
gy, since the time [the original third-party doctrine] cases [were decided] has changed dramatically 
. . . .”). 
 195 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–35 (adapting Fourth Amendment jurisprudence so as to not “leave 
the [suspect] at the mercy of advancing technology”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that an individual retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records because their 
disclosure is not “volitional,” but rather necessary to “participate in the economic life of contemporary 
society”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967) (adapting Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence to account for advancements in technology). 
 196 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing for a reform of the third-
party doctrine due to the prevalence with which individuals disclose personal information to third 
parties in today’s world). 
 197 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 435–36; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632–36; see also supra notes 140–150 and 
accompanying text (describing Bah and Turner courts’ discussions of privacy interests arising in cards 
as compared to privacy interests arising in cell phones). 
 198 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987); see also Kerr, supra note 186 (arguing 
that Fourth Amendment searches do not require that the search reveal substantial amounts of personal 
information); Kerr, supra note 92 (arguing that scans of cards should be considered Fourth Amend-
ment searches based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Hicks). 
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Amendment.199 Conversely, it was conceded in Riley that the government had 
committed a Fourth Amendment search when it accessed the contents of the 
lawfully seized cell phone.200 Instead, the dispositive question before the Riley 
Court was whether or not the search was reasonable.201 Reasoning that the 
modern cell phone’s substantial storage capability and tendency to contain sensi-
tive personal information created a privacy interest that far outweighed the gov-
ernment’s purported interest in searching the cell phone, the Riley Court held 
that the warrantless search was unreasonable.202 
It appears, however, that the Bah and Turner courts applied Riley’s rea-
soning on the reasonability of the Fourth Amendment search at issue to their 
respective determinations on whether scanning a card is a Fourth Amendment 
search.203 The courts concluded that the lack of storage capacity and personal 
information contained in a card precluded an individual from claiming a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the encoded information.204 
The Bah and Turner courts’ conclusion that a card’s lack of storage capac-
ity and personal information militates against a finding that a Fourth Amend-
ment search occurred is belied by previous court holdings.205 Indeed, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that government action may constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search even if the object or item being searched does not store 
anything overly personal or private.206 Instead, the Court has scrutinized the 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 431; Bah, 794 F.3d at 621. 
 200 Turner, 839 F.3d at 434 n.2 (finding that “[t]here was no dispute in Riley that reviewing the 
contents of a cell phone involved a search”). 
 201 See id. (“At issue was only whether such a search was permissible without a warrant when 
conducted during an arrest.”). As discussed supra, when adjudicating a Fourth Amendment dispute, a 
court must first determine whether or not the government’s conduct was a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. See Lucier, supra note 23, at 1811 (noting that “[a]s a threshold question, 
courts must first determine whether a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ occurred”). If the conduct is deemed to 
have been a Fourth Amendment search, the question then turns to whether or not the search was rea-
sonable. Id. 
 202 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–91 (2014). 
 203 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–35; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632–33. 
 204 See Turner, 839 F.3d at 434–35; Bah, 794 F.3d at 632–33. 
 205 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324–25 (holding that moving a turntable to read its serial number was a 
search under the Fourth Amendment); Kerr, supra note 186 (arguing that Fourth Amendment searches 
do not require that the search reveal substantial amounts of personal information); see also Bond v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000) (holding that law enforcement committed a Fourth Amend-
ment search when they felt the outside of a bag stowed on a public bus in “an exploratory manner[,]” 
even though such a search would not reveal overly personal information because the bag was never 
opened); United States v. Makeeff, 820 F.3d 995, 1002–03 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding a search of a USB 
drive to be a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(holding a warrantless search of rewritable CDs to be a Fourth Amendment search and thus required 
to fit within an exception to the warrant requirement in order to be admissible). 
 206 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324–25 (holding a search that revealed only a serial number to be a 
Fourth Amendment search); Kerr, supra note 186 (arguing that “the kind or amount of information 
obtained is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment protects all ‘effects’ from searches, and there is no de 
minimis doctrine where breaking in just to get a few small things does not constitute a search”). 
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government’s means of attaining the underlying contents of an item.207 As 
prominent Fourth Amendment scholar Orin Kerr has previously argued, one 
such example transpired in 1987, in Arizona v. Hicks, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a Fourth Amendment search occurred when a law enforcement 
officer moved a turntable to record its serial number.208 Although the turntable 
itself was in plain view, the serial number was not.209 In holding that a Fourth 
Amendment search occurred, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that 
“[i]t matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any great personal value 
to respondent . . . . A search is a search.”210 
Similarly, as Professor Kerr points out, neither the amount nor the nature 
of the information stored within the magnetic stripe of a card are dispositive of 
whether or not the appellants could claim a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.211 The law enforcement officers in Bah and Turner “t[ook] action” that 
“exposed to view concealed portions” of the seized cards and thus “produce[d] 
a new invasion of [the appellants’] privacy.”212 Regardless of the likelihood 
that the scans would reveal the information to be identical to the information 
embossed on the card, the act of scanning the cards was “more than trivial for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment,” and the Bah and Turner courts should 
therefore have held that scanning the cards were Fourth Amendment search-
es.213 
                                                                                                                           
 207 See, e.g., Bond, 529 U.S. at 339 (holding that feeling the outside of a bag was a Fourth 
Amendment search); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324–325 (holding that slightly moving a turntable was a 
Fourth Amendment search). 
 208 Kerr, supra note 92 (arguing that scans of cards should be considered Fourth Amendment 
searches based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Hicks); see Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324–325. 
 209 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325. 
 210 Id. 
 211 See id. at 324–25; Kerr, supra note 186 (arguing that “the kind or amount of information ob-
tained is irrelevant”); see also DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 436 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that courts 
have held that the search of certain containers, such as cereal boxes or guitar bags, are Fourth 
Amendment searches irrespective of the fact that such searches were unlikely to reveal anything of 
great value); United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that “because the Su-
preme Court in Hicks held that the search of the stereo equipment was unlawful, it necessarily also 
found . . . that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in that equipment”). 
 212 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 (finding that “taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the au-
thorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did 
produce a new invasion of respondent’s privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated 
the entry”). 
 213 See id. (concluding that although looking at the turntable did not require a warrant, moving the 
turn table was “much more than trivial for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment”); Kerr, supra note 
92 (arguing that scans of cards should be considered Fourth Amendment searches). 
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CONCLUSION 
Scanning the magnetic stripes of cards to access the information encoded 
therein should be considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. The U.S. Courts of Appeals’ collective refusal to recognize this 
sets an arbitrary precedent that encourages future courts to scrutinize merely 
the amount and nature of information being searched. Such a prioritization 
contravenes the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, as the Founders sought to 
protect individuals from the methods by which the government searched, re-
gardless of what it was that they were searching for. In an era of continual 
technological advancement, such an arbitrary focus will undoubtedly threaten 
legitimate expectations of privacy. This includes the expectation of privacy in 
the encoded information of cards. The government should therefore be re-
quired to act reasonably when scanning the magnetic stripes of cards. After all, 
“[a] search is a search,” regardless of what it may reveal. 
JOHN A. LEBLANC 
